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For a given research question, there are usually a large variety of possi-
ble analysis strategies acceptable according to the scientific standards of
the field, and there are concerns that this multiplicity of analysis strate-
gies plays an important role in the non-replicability of research findings.
Here, we define a general framework on common sources of uncertainty
arising in computational analyses that lead to this multiplicity, and ap-
ply this framework within an overview of approaches proposed across
disciplines to address the issue. Armed with this framework, and a
set of recommendations derived therefrom, researchers will be able to
recognize strategies applicable to their field and use them to generate
findings more likely to be replicated in future studies, ultimately im-
proving the credibility of the scientific process.
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In recent years, the scientific community has been rocked by the recognition
that research findings often do not replicate on independent data, leading to what
has been referred to as a replication crisis [1], reproducibility crisis [2] or statisti-
cal crisis in science [3]. In particular, a series of attempts to reproduce the results
of published research findings in different disciplines found that these replication
efforts produced much weaker evidence than the original study [4, 5, 6, 7]. It has
been estimated that in preclinical research alone, approximately $28 billion dollars
are spent every year on research findings that are not replicable1 [10].
The crisis has consequences far beyond an insular world of scientists. Experts
with strongly disagreeing viewpoints and publicized results that are subsequently
contradicted are highly detrimental to the trust the general public and decision
makers have in scientific results. This distrust endangers one of the key functions
of science - providing robust research findings that can be built upon to help tackle
important challenges to society [11]. The recent intense public debate surrounding
key “global issues” identified and targeted by the United Nations [12] – such as,
for example, climate change and migration – and the ambivalent public perception
of scientific contributions to these issues illustrates the importance of the scientific
community retaining credibility.
While there have been a number of widely publicized examples of fraud and scien-
tific misconduct [13, 14], many researchers agree that this is not the major problem
in this crisis [3, 15]. Instead, the problems seem to be more subtle and partly due
to the multiplicity of possible analysis strategies [16, 17].
For a given research question of interest, there is usually great flexibility in the
1While the two terms replicability and reproducibility are sometimes used interchange-
ably, we will here adopt the definition of Peng [8] and Stodden et al. [9] according to
which replicability is the ability to obtain a similar result when an independent data set
is analyzed, while reproducibility is the ability to obtain identical results when the same
data set is analyzed by an independent researcher using the same methods.
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choice of analysis strategy, as many possible strategies are acceptable according to
the scientific standards of the field [18, 19]. The resulting multiplicity of possible
analysis strategies is nicely illustrated by a recent experiment performed by Sil-
berzahn et al. [20]: they recruited 29 teams of researchers with strong statistical
background and asked them to answer the same research question (“Are football
referees more likely to give red cards to players with dark skin than to players with
light skin?”) with the same data set. The teams obtained highly varied results,
as they approached the data with a wide array of analytical techniques. There
is evidence that the combination of this multiplicity with selective reporting can
systematically lead to an increase in false positive results, inflated effect sizes and
overoptimistic measures of predictive performance [21, 22, 23, 24, 17]. Ignoring
the multiplicity of analysis strategies can therefore lead to an overconfidence in the
precision of results and to research findings that do not replicate on independent
data.
While the social and biomedical sciences have been at the heart of the recent repli-
cation crisis in science, the multiplicity of analysis strategies has also contributed
to credibility crises in other disciplines, e.g. - very prominently - in climatology.
In 2009, emails and documents of leading climate scientists at the University of
East Anglia became publicly available. Taken out of context, parts of these emails
suggested that researchers felt it was “a travesty” they could not “account for the
lack of warming”, and included an allusion to “Mike’s Nature trick” to “hide the
decline” [25]. This incident, which received broad media attention, became known
as “climategate” and led to an erosion of belief in climate change [26, 27] by cre-
ating the impression that climatologists are exploiting the multiplicity of possible
analysis strategies to obtain overly alarmist results.
In response to the current crisis in science, a myriad of solutions to improve
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the replicability of empirical findings have been developed in different disciplines.
There are for instance a number of recently proposed approaches which assess the
robustness of research findings to alternative analytical pathways by reporting the
results of a large number of analysis strategies: the “vibration of effects” approach
in epidemiology [28], “specification curve analysis” [29] and “multiverse analysis”
in psychology [30], a “measure of robustness to misspecification” in economics
[31] or “multimodel analysis” [32] and “computational robustness analysis” [33]
in sociology. In other disciplines, including climatology, ecology and risk analy-
sis, there is a long-standing tradition of addressing the robustness to alternative
analysis strategies through sensitivity analyses, multimodel ensembles [34] and
Bayesian model averaging [35, 36]. While the development of approaches address-
ing the issue of the multiplicity of possible analysis strategies remains important,
we currently risk “reinventing the wheel” in each discipline. In order to avoid the
proliferation of approaches that address the same problems with similar ideas, we
consider it advisable to benefit from lessons learned in other disciplines by means
of a multidisciplinary perspective. In this work, we define a framework on common
sources of uncertainty arising in computational analyses across a broad range of
disciplines, covering both the statistical analysis of empirical data and the predic-
tion of complex systems of interest through mechanistic physically-based models.
The aim of this framework is to provide a common language to efficiently translate
ideas and approaches across disciplines. We illustrate how it can help researchers
benefit from experiences gained in other fields by giving an overview of solutions
and ideas that have been proposed to improve the replicability and credibility of
research findings.
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The multiplicity of analysis strategies: exam-
ples from epidemiology and hydroclimatology
In a large number of disciplines, an important part of a given research project
is the generation of numerical results describing the association between p input
variables (denoted by X1, X2, . . . , Xp in the following) and an outcome variable Y
through a mathematical function f(). f() is typically referred to as the model,
while the input variables X1, X2, . . . , Xp are called independent, exogenous, or ex-
planatory variables, or predictors, features, attributes or covariates, depending on
context and discipline. The outcome variable Y is also known as the dependent,
endogeneous, or response variable, or the output, label, criterion, or predictand.
In the following, we refer to this type of research, which relies to some extent on
data, as empirical research, in contrast to research that is of a purely theoretical
nature.
To illustrate the multitude of analyst decisions necessary in empirical research, we
consider two examples from different disciplines. The first example is the analysis
of data from an epidemiological study on the link between meat consumption and
the risk of colorectal cancer to answer a research question in public health which
has attracted considerable attention in recent years. The second example, from
hydroclimatology, concerns the prediction of water mass stored in seasonal snow-
pack and its release as meltwater into the river runoff [37, 38], which is essential
in the prediction of future flood occurrence and water availability for irrigation
and hydropower generation. Figure 1 illustrates how the analysis decisions in em-
pirical research, applied to these two examples, lead to a multiplicity of analysis
strategies.
Both in observational epidemiology and hydroclimatology, the first step is to col-
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Figure 1: The multiplicity of analysis strategies to obtain an estimate of the
parameter of interest θ and values of the outcome variable Y in epidemiology
and hydroclimatology, respectively
lect data on the phenomenon of interest. In our example from epidemiology, these
data come from n individuals who are assumed to form a representative sample
from a specified population of interest. In our example from hydroclimatology, the
system to be investigated is a valley of a certain size in which the winter snowpack
is transformed into spring snowmelt-induced streamflow. The data, which are in-
dexed by space and time, consist of two parts. The first part are historical data
for which observations at one or more meteorological stations exist for the input
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variables which include, e.g., time series data of measured air temperature and
precipitation covering the previous 20 years. The outcome is the gauge streamflow
at the outlet of the valley. The second part consists of values of the model input
variables which reflect future changes in temperature and precipitation resulting
from different greenhouse gas emission scenarios: with these model input variables
in hand, and a developed model, one can predict the future evolution of the sea-
sonal snowpack and hence, the resulting streamflow.
For both examples, before beginning analysis, the data must be preprocessed, a
procedure involving numerous subjective choices. The flexibility in data prepro-
cessing partly arises because the research hypotheses are generally not precise
enough that they fully specify the input and the outcome variables [17]. Indeed,
while measuring meat consumption and determining incidence of colon cancer may
näıvely appear to be straightforward, the analyst has considerable flexibility in the
definition of these two variables. For the same research question, one could con-
sider meat consumption of all kinds, focus on red meat or processed meat, or
distinguish between beef, pork, lamb and chicken [39]. Similarly, concerning the
outcome, it is possible to concentrate on colon cancer, on rectal cancer or to in-
clude all types of colorectal cancer and even precancerous lesions like colorectal
adenoma. In our example from hydroclimatology, we are faced with similar choices.
For instance, in the absence of measurements of the input variables for all locations
in the region of interest, the recordings from a single meteorological station have
to be extrapolated. Further, the possible values of temperature and precipitation
reflecting changes in greenhouse gas emission scenarios are themselves outputs of
mechanistic models. There are a large number of strategies to obtain both spatial
extrapolations and these possible future values.
Following data preprocessing, we next decide on a model to describe our phe-
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nomenon of interest. In epidemiology, the aim is to control for all variables which
might confound the association between meat consumption and colorectal cancer.
These variables may for instance include body mass index, smoking, physical ac-
tivity, socioeconomic status and the consumption of alcohol, fruits and vegetables
[40, 41]. However, this is not an exhaustive list and there is no clear guidance
on which variables should be considered mandatory in the model and which will
lead to an unnecessarily complex description of the phenomenon of interest. Simi-
larly, a model describing how snow accumulates, is stored and melts can be based
on a variety of alternative model assumptions, potentially leading to “1701 snow
models” [37]: examples include modelling the snow microstructure and evolution
over time in physical detail, or a more simplified description of these processes in
a snowpack representation with a single layer. Additionally, there are a number of
model parameters to be specified in order to predict the seasonal snowpack evo-
lution, parameters such as, e.g., the surface albedo and roughness length, and the
initial density of the snow [38].
Once the model structure and its constituent variables are specified, there remain
further decisions concerning the method to use to obtain the main result of inter-
est. In our example from epidemiology, the result of interest is an estimate of a
parameter θ describing the increase in colorectal cancer risk associated with meat
consumption. Common estimation techniques for this model parameter include
maximum likelihood estimation, Bayesian inference, least squares minimization
and the method of moments. In our hydroclimatology example, the result of in-
terest is the outcome Y, i.e. the water equivalent in the seasonal snowpack and its
melt. A first method choice concerns the discretization of the system to be inves-
tigated in space and time, i.e. the temporal and spatial resolution of the model
setup. Further method choices arise due to the terabytes of simulation outputs
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typically produced. These simulation outputs consist of a myriad of state variables
describing for instance snow depth, snow surface temperature and snow density.
To be able to interpret these outputs, they have to be aggregated, analyzed and
illustrated; however, different transformations and spatial and temporal aggrega-
tion techniques may either mask or accentuate oscillations and trends which may
be present in these results.
Through the illustration of two examples from different fields, we see that for a
research question of interest, researchers across disciplines are faced with a mul-
titude of choices when presented with data in a situation where there is no clear
guidance on analysis strategy from a theoretical or a substantive point of view.
Although some of the choices made could be considered ’wrong’, many would also
be justifiable. As all justifiable paths are likely to lead to different results, we
see there is a source of variability attributable to the choice of analysis strategy.
In the presentation of scientific results, however, this variability is not commonly
accounted for or discussed.
Sources of uncertainty arising in empirical re-
search
As the aim of research is to expand existing knowledge by operating on the edge
of what is known, it is hardly surprising that there are numerous sources of uncer-
tainty arising in scientific discovery. In this section, we will introduce a general,
albeit inevitably incomplete, framework on common sources of uncertainty arising
in computational analyses and show how the combination of these sources of un-
certainty with selective reporting can lead to unreplicable research findings.
The idea behind the use of a mathematical model f() is, in general, either ex-
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planation or prediction [42, 43]. The modelling of the association between meat
consumption and colorectal cancer in epidemiology can be seen as an instance
of explanatory modelling. The main aims of explanatory modelling are to test
a causal hypothesis [24], i.e. to assess to what extent a theoretical variable Y is
influenced by the theoretical variables X1, . . . ,Xp. As these theoretical variables
are not directly observable, they have to be operationalized by defining measurable
outcome Y and input variables X1, X2, . . . , Xp [43]. Once these observable vari-
ables are measured on a sample of observations, statistical methods can be used
to estimate the value of an unknown parameter of interest θ which quantifies the
association between Y and X1, . . . , Xp. The reporting of this parameter estimate
is typically combined with a p-value and a confidence interval, which are used to
test the research hypothesis concerning the association between Y and X1, . . . ,Xp.
Our example from hydroclimatology, the modelling of the future evolution of the
seasonal snowpack, on the other hand, can be seen as an instance of what can be
referred to as mechanistic predictive modelling. The idea of mechanistic predic-
tive modelling is to predict the values of an outcome Y at new or untried values
of the input variables. In contrast to explanatory modelling, the goal of mecha-
nistic predictive modelling is hence to apply a model to predict the behavior of
a system which is so complex that it would be difficult to predict and analyze
otherwise [44]. Mechanistic predictive models (also referred to as physically- or
process-based models [45, 46]) typically heavily rely on subject matter knowledge
and the (physical) principles underlying the behavior of the studied phenomenon.
Hence, model predictions are derived by relying on a number of physical laws or
mechanistic assumptions, and the values of a certain number of model parameters
θ = (θ1, . . . , θp), which are assumed to be known.













































Figure 2: Sources of uncertainty in explanatory, mechanistic predictive and
agnostic predictive modelling. The model structure describes the association
between the p input variables X1, X2, . . . , Xp and the outcome of interest Y .
θ is a parameter and e represents a probabilistic error term.
putational efficiency, a second type of data-driven predictive modelling coming
from an algorithmic modelling culture - often from artificial intelligence and more
specifically from machine learning - is growing in popularity in many disciplines
[47, 48]. Here the function f() is estimated by an algorithm rather than by fitting
a pre-specified model class to the data [42]. These algorithms try to dispense with
(potentially restrictive) assumptions on the association between X1, X2, . . . , Xp
and Y [49] and do not typically rely on theoretical reasoning: they can thus be
referred to as “agnostic” predictive models.
Despite the main focus of explanatory modelling being the estimation of an un-
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known parameter and the main focus of predictive modelling being prediction,
many analyses are concerned with both aims. For example, some parameter val-
ues in mechanistic predictive modelling can be determined by fitting the model to
historical data in which both the input variables and the outcome are measured, a
process referred to as calibration [44]. Conversely, in explanatory modelling, where
the main focus is on explanation, the estimated parameter values can be used to
predict new observations and to evaluate the adequacy of the chosen probability
model [24].
While certain types of models are more popular in some disciplines than in others,
there is no unique assignment of disciplines to modelling strategies. Mechanistic
predictive models, which are popular in disciplines ranging from the geosciences
and risk analysis to decision analytic modelling in health economics, can also be
used in the prediction of infectious disease dynamics in epidemiology [50]. Ex-
planatory modelling, on the other hand, which is popular in disciplines such as
biology, psychology and economics [43, 51], can for example also be applied in cli-
matology when assessing the extent to which an extreme event can be attributed
to anthropogenic climate change [52].
As illustrated in our examples from epidemiology and hydroclimatology, the mul-
tiplicity of possible analysis strategies can arise from data preprocessing, param-
eter, model and method choices. Data preprocessing uncertainty is caused by all
decisions needing to be made in the selection of the data to analyze and in the
definition, the cleaning and the transformation of the input and the outcome vari-
ables. Additionally, there is usually model uncertainty, as the best or the “true”
model structure to describe the phenomenon of interest is unknown. Parameter
uncertainty, which is mainly present in predictive modelling, arises through model
parameter values having to be specified when the analyst is armed with neither
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precise theoretical knowledge nor direct measurements [44]. In mechanistic predic-
tive modelling, estimates of these parameter values can be achieved by observation
of the system, through calibration or incomplete expert knowledge [44, 46], but
substantial uncertainty regarding the true values typically remains. Similarly, the
performance of many algorithms for agnostic modelling is sensitive to hyperparam-
eters [19], which have to be specified before running these algorithms. Examples
include the minimal size of splitting nodes in random forests, the kernel and the
cost parameter in support vector machines, and the number of neighbors in k-
nearest neighbors [53]. As there is typically no clear guidance on which values
to choose for these hyperparameters, their specification is sometimes considered
to be more of an art than a science. Finally, specifying a model and parameter
values is not sufficient to run the actual computations – a specific implementation
and computational method must be chosen, or even developed, before a statistical
model can be estimated or predictions from a mechanistic or agnostic model de-
rived. Again, there is a multitude of options without clear guidance or a definitive
choice on the method that will provide the most suitable answer to their research
question: researchers encounter here method uncertainty [54].
The uncertainties detailed above – data preprocessing uncertainty, parameter un-
certainty, model uncertainty and method uncertainty – are epistemic: they arise
due to a lack of knowledge. As illustrated in Figure 2, these epistemic sources of
uncertainty can be contrasted with two additional sources of uncertainty, namely
measurement uncertainty and sampling uncertainty.
Measurement uncertainty is ubiquitous in empirical research as it is generally im-
possible to determine the input variables X1, . . . , Xp and the outcome Y with ab-
solute precision and accuracy. Depending on the discipline, information on these
variables may be acquired through questionnaires, measurement devices or exper-
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imental protocols, which are all, to some extent, prone to imprecision. The final
type of uncertainty described here, especially prominent in explanatory modelling,
results from the variability introduced when analyzing a data set assumed to be
a random sample from a larger population of interest. This variability can be
described as sampling uncertainty, and is often expressed through an error term e.
The interplay between these random sources of uncertainty and the multiplicity
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Figure 3: The impact of random sources of uncertainty and of the multiplicity
of possible analysis strategies on the replicability of research findings. The
result of interest is the parameter θ in explanatory modelling, the outcome
Y in mechanistic predictive modelling and the predictive performance in
agnostic predictive modelling.
of analysis strategies arising from the four epistemic sources of uncertainty can
lead to unreplicable research findings when combined with selective reporting, as
illustrated in Figure 3. If there is no restriction on the chosen analysis strategy,
a researcher may try to compare the results of many strategies – each a path
resulting from the given preprocessing, model, parameter and method choices –
and then select the final analysis strategy based on the “nicest” result: a smaller
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p-value, an effect in the “desired” direction, or predictions in accordance with the
expectations of the researcher, for example. This “selective reporting” can lead
to a substantial overestimation of the result of interest in empirical research, an
effect heightened by small samples and imprecise measurements [1, 55].
In explanatory modelling, confidence intervals and hypothesis tests typically only
account for sampling uncertainty, while ignoring measurement and epistemic un-
certainty. This limited focus thereby leads to apparently precise results which are
not robust to variations in the choice of analysis strategy; they therefore have a
high probability of being contradicted in a replication study.
Lessons learned across disciplines
The solution to the replication crisis which has probably received the most at-
tention in the scientific community and beyond is the abandonment of statistical
significance within the scientific literature and its replacement with Bayes factors,
confidence intervals or other inferential methods [56, 57, 58, 59, 60]. While there
may be inferential paradigms that are easier to interpret and less prone to over-
confidence than null hypothesis statistical testing [61, 62], the simple solution of
jettisoning statistical significance can seem somewhat shortsighted in addressing
the issues. Taking confidence intervals as an example, Figure 3 illustrates how
they can be just as prone as p-values to selective reporting. More generally, no
inferential paradigm in itself is immune to overconfidence and the result-dependent
selection of an analysis strategy from among a multiplicity of possible strategies
[63, 64].
Another prominent solution which has been proposed in response to the replica-
tion crisis in science is to increase transparency by promoting reproducible research
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practices [65, 66]. While the publication of research data, code and materials can
help build trust in science [67] and make the entire research process more effi-
cient, it only indirectly addresses the multiplicity of possible analysis strategies.
Transparency alone is again not enough to prevent selective reporting or eliminate
overconfidence in results [68].
We therefore argue that we have to go beyond open science practices and the focus
on statistical significance as the main culprit in the non-replicability of research
findings by explicitly addressing the sources of uncertainty introduced in the pre-
vious section. A wealth of ideas and approaches to reduce, report, integrate or
accept one or several of the sources of uncertainty have been discussed in the lit-
erature, leading to a myriad of solutions in different disciplines. In Figures 4 and
5, we give an overview of these solutions and derive simple steps researchers can
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Figure 4: Overview of solutions to the replication crisis which address the




There are a variety of strategies to reduce one or several sources of uncertainty. In
explanatory modelling, a reduction in sampling and measurement uncertainty can
for instance be achieved by increasing the sample size of studies [69, 70, 71], by
improving the quality of measurements [1] or by standardizing experimental condi-
tions [72, 73, 74]. To reduce model and data preprocessing uncertainty, Steegen et
al. [30] and Schaller [75] call for more conceptual rigor and precise theories to re-
duce the number of possible analysis strategies. Method uncertainty, on the other
hand, can be reduced through adoption of the results of “benchmarking” studies,
which aim to identify a best method for a given research question of interest in
a given setting [54, 76]. The integration of existing knowledge into explanatory
modelling can also reduce uncertainty and help to obtain more precise parameter
estimates. An example is the specification of informative prior distributions [77]
in Bayesian inference, where the prior evidence can range from functional infor-
mation in genome-wide association studies [78] to historical data in clinical trials
[79].
Report uncertainty
In many disciplines, there is a long-standing tradition of reporting the results of a
large number of possible analysis strategies, or the variability of these results, to
assess their robustness to alternative assumptions and model specifications. Com-
mon examples of this strategy include extreme bounds analysis in econometrics
[80], multimodel ensembles [34] in hydrology and climatology and sensitivity anal-
yses, which are used across many disciplines. More recent approaches to report
uncertainty include the “vibration of effects” approach [28], “specification curve
analysis” [29], “multiverse analysis” [30] “multimodel analysis” [32] and “compu-
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tational robustness analysis” [33], as discussed previously. Silberzahn et al. [20]
go a step further and propose the reporting of the results of different teams of
researchers analyzing the same research question on the same data set. In their
“crowdsourcing approach”, it is thereby possible to simultaneously report the vari-
ability in results due to data preprocessing, model and method uncertainty, as dif-
ferent teams of researchers are likely to follow different paths in formulating their
analysis strategies. Considered from a multidisciplinary perspective, this approach
is similar to intercomparison studies, which have a long tradition in mechanistic
predictive modelling in hydroclimatology [81]. In cases where the data are made
publicly available, methods to report uncertainty can be applied by readers and
reviewers to assess to what extent the originally reported results are robust to
alternative analysis choices.
Integrate uncertainty
There are a number of approaches which can generate broader and more realistic
uncertainty intervals by integrating measurement, model, parameter or method
uncertainty when deriving parameter estimates in explanatory modelling and pre-
dictions in mechanistic and agnostic predictive modelling. In explanatory mod-
elling, it is possible to account for measurement uncertainty through, for example,
structural equation models [82], Bayesian hierarchical approaches [83], simulation
extrapolation or regression calibration [84]. With regard to model uncertainty,
Bayesian model averaging [35, 36] and multimodel inference [85] go beyond the
simple reporting of the results of all possible models by weighting the parame-
ter estimates or predictions of all candidate models to produce a single summary
measure and a measure of its uncertainty. In mechanistic predictive modelling,
Bayesian melding [86] and probabilistic sensitivity analysis [87] can be used to
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integrate parameter uncertainty. Similarly, in agnostic modelling, it has been sug-
gested to account for parameter uncertainty through Bayesian deep learning, where
the uncertainty in hyperparameters is described by a prior distribution [88], and
to integrate method uncertainty by combining the weighted predictions of a great
number of candidate methods through a so-called “Super Learner” [89].
Accept uncertainty
Many authors have argued that classical statistical methods used in explanatory
modelling suggest a disproportionate level of certainty [90, 57] and that the repli-
cation crisis in science is in fact a “crisis of overconfidence in statistical results”
[91]. In this sense, a solution to the current crisis is to acknowledge the inherent
uncertainty in scientific findings. This can be achieved by recognizing that statisti-
cal inference within exploratory analyses should be interpreted with great caution
and that scientific generalizations need to be based on cumulative knowledge rather
than on a single study [91]. Strictly confirmatory analyses can be realized either
through the pre-registration of analysis plans [92, 93] and registered reports [94],
where the analysis strategy is specified in detail before observing the data; or
through blind analyses, where researchers select an analysis strategy while being
blinded to the outcome of interest [95]. Alternatively, it is common in agnostic
modeling to perform exploratory and confirmatory analysis on the same data set
through split analysis plans: one part of the data is used to determine the best
analysis strategy, the other to fit the final algorithm and determine its predictive
performance [51].
A focus on cumulative evidence can be found in calls for replications as post-
publication quality control [96, 97, 17] and in the proposal of Benjamin et al. [98]
to redefine statistical significance by considering a p-value of < 0.05 merely sug-
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gestive (i.e. having to be confirmed in subsequent studies) and only p-values <
0.005 significant. In psychology, Simons et al. [99] emphasize the need for cu-
mulative evidence and encourage authors to specify a “constraints on generality”
statement, which clearly identifies and justifies the target population of reported
research findings. In biology, cumulative knowledge can be achieved by providing
multiple lines of convergent evidence from several independent experiments, ex-
periments performed for instance with isolated molecules, in cultured cell lines, or
using animal models. Lastly, in psychology and medicine we see the usefulness of
meta-analyses, the summarization and aggregation of the results of similar studies.
Steps to take to make one’s own research more replica-
ble
Based on the lessons learned across disciplines discussed in the previous section,
what are the steps an individual researcher can take to improve the replicability
and credibility or his or her own research? A first step, which should not be under-
estimated, is simply to be aware of the multiplicity of possible analysis strategies
and the potential for selective reporting. As pointed out by Nuzzo [100], even
the most honest researcher is a master of self-deception and it is easy to jump to
conclusions when finding patterns in randomness.
Once aware of the potential for increased uncertainty, one should evaluate and im-
plement possibilities to reduce both the randomness in the data and the flexibility
in analysis plan. In our example from epidemiology, we could for instance have
reduced some of the sources of uncertainty by determining an adequate sample
size through a power calculation, by integrating results from previous studies on
meat consumption and colorectal cancer to specify an informative prior distribu-
tion and by clearly defining the research hypothesis and the input and outcome
21
Step 1:   
Be aware of the multiplicity of possible analysis strategies
Step 2: 
 If possible, reduce sources of uncertainty before the analysis
Step 3a: 
 If possible, integrate remaining sources of uncertainty into the analysis
Step 3b: 
Report the results of alternative analysis strategies to assess  
the robustness of results
Step 4: 
Acknowledge the inherent uncertainty in your findings
Step 5: 
Publish all research code, data and material
Figure 5: Recommendations on steps researchers can take to make their
research findings more replicable and credible
variables before collecting the data. In our hydroclimatology study, measurement
and model uncertainty could have been reduced by, for example, including a very
large number of confirmed measurements of the input variables, e.g. through the
integration of remote sensing data, and by using only models that had been ex-
tensively validated elsewhere.
When deriving the result of interest, one should attempt to integrate all sources of
uncertainty which could not be reduced in the previous step. Since to this point
there is no all-encompassing method accounting for model, measurement, method,
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data preprocessing and parameter uncertainty simultaneously, an alternative is to
systematically report the robustness to alternative analysis strategies through one
of the approaches presented in the last section. The next step – again, not to
be underestimated – is to acknowledge the inherent uncertainty in the presented
research findings and thereby avoid misleading readers into overinterpretation of
the relevance of the results.
Finally, to make one’s research findings more credible and improve the efficiency
of the research process as a whole, one should publish all research code, data and
material, both to allow others to try alternative analysis strategies and for reuse
of the data in future studies.
Outlook
Despite growing evidence for its pervasive impact on the validity of research find-
ings, current research practices largely fail to address the multiplicity of analysis
strategies. Currently, it is a highly profitable strategy to analyze small data sets
and to exploit the multiplicity of possible analysis strategies arising from data pre-
processing, model, parameter, and method uncertainty to obtain significant and
surprising results. These results have a high probability of getting published, but
a low probability of being replicated in subsequent studies. In the short-term this
lack of replication may simply be embarrassing, but in the long run this strategy
has devastating consequences for the scientific community. While imprecise but
convergent results are often readily accepted by the public, multiple apparently
precise but contradictory results have a negative impact on the credibility of re-
search findings [101, 102]: these contradictory results can easily be discredited as
conflicting evidence to create the impression that scientific knowledge is unreliable
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and that there is no scientific consensus on important research topics [103]. Ac-
cording to van der Linden et al. [104], this line of argumentation has been used
for years to delay or prevent regulatory actions concerning climate change, maybe
contributing to the low belief in anthropogenic climate change among the Ameri-
can public [105].
If, on the other hand, we address the multiplicity of possible analysis strategies
arising through data preprocessing, model, parameter and method uncertainty
through reporting, integrating and acknowledgement, we will obtain broad but
more realistic measures of our uncertainty, and research findings that are robust
to the choice of the analysis strategy.
It is important to raise awareness of the fact that the multiplicity of possible anal-
ysis strategies is an issue affecting many different disciplines in similar ways; this
awareness will enable us to join forces in our efforts to increase the transparency,
replicability and credibility of research findings. Integrating multidisciplinary ex-
perience and insights is not only essential in the further development of appropriate
solutions and in the elaboration of guidelines to help researchers make their re-
search more replicable, but also in generating enough momentum to bring about
change. As long as the reward structure in academia favors significant, overly
clear-cut, and hypothesis-consistent results, researchers might be tempted to ex-
ploit the multiplicity of possible analysis strategies instead of addressing this issue
in a transparent way to make research findings more replicable. This creates a
social dilemma structure where societal and scientific interests are at odds with
the individual career interest of researchers.
The multiplicity of possible analysis strategies is likely to become an even bigger
challenge with the advent of increasing amounts of data that are not originally
recorded for research purposes in many disciplines, for instance in the form of
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routine care data in medicine, of administrative data in the social sciences and of
remote sensing data in ecology [106, 107, 108, 24]. These data are not the result of
well-designed experiments where we have accurate knowledge on the data genera-
tion process, and a small set of research hypotheses of interest. Instead, the data
may be imperfect, heterogeneous, noisy, and high-dimensional [47, 109]. When an-
alyzing these data, sampling uncertainty, which has attracted a disproportionate
amount of attention in the scientific community to this point, will be comparably
small, but measurement, data preprocessing, model, and method uncertainty will
be much larger than when dealing with more traditional data [110].
Given the importance and the urgency of the challenges we are facing today, we
need scientific results that are veracious - both in their precision and in their
(preliminary) imprecision. Novel and exciting but unreplicable results impede
scientific progress and its societal translation. By addressing the multiplicity of
possible analysis strategies through the framework and approaches suggested here,
we can make the research process more efficient and improve the replicability, and
ultimately the credibility, of research findings.
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